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cryptography, and archaeology, and are now being formalized by people 
in the intelligent design movement. Demski concludes his contribution, 
and the volume, by drawing on the work of biochemist Michael Behe to 
argue that acceptance of the possibility of design in natural systems will 
enrich science, not stifle it. 
Referring to God: Jewish and Christian Philosophical and Theological Perspectives, 
(ed.) Paul Helm. St Martin's Press, 2000. ix + 175. $65.00 
TIM BA YNE, Macquarie University. 
Although both the title of this volume and its introduction suggest that its 
concern is with issues that lie at the intersection of philosophy of language 
and inter-religious dialogue, readers looking for sustained discussion of 
these topics will be disappointed. Four of the seven chapters are based on 
papers (and their commentaries) delivered at a conference on Christian 
and Jewish philosophy of religion, but forays into inter-religious dialogue 
are infrequent, and only one contribution - Joe Houston's "William Alston 
on Referring to God" - explicitly engages with the question of how refer-
ence to God is secured. 
In fact, the papers included in this volume form a rather mixed bag. In 
"The Source and Destination of Thought" John Haldane presents an argu-
ment for God's existence based on concept-acquisition. Jerome Gellman 
has two papers in this collection. In "Identifying God in Experience: On 
Strawson, Sounds and God's Space" he responds to objections against 
experience-based arguments for God's existences by drawing on some 
ideas in Strawson's Individuals. In his second paper, "Judaic Perspectives 
on Petitionary Prayer" Gellman develops a model of petitionary prayer 
based on the idea of holding God to his promises. Eleonore Stump con-
trasts the theodicies of Aquinas and Saadia, a tenth century Jewish philoso-
pher, in "The God of Abraham, Saadia and Aquinas," and in "Maimonides 
and Calvin on Accommodation" Paul Helm examines the different roles 
that Maimonides and Calvin assign to equivocation in their accounts of 
religious language. 
Rather than attempt to say a bit about each paper, I will restrict my com-
ments to two contributions: Haldane's "The Source and Destination of 
Thought" and Houston's "William Alston on Referring to God". Haldane 
develops a semantic version of the cosmological argument, what he calls 
the "Prime Thinker" argument. According to Haldane, neither of the two 
standard naturalistic accounts of concept-acquisition - abstractionism and 
innatism - are satisfactory. More promising is the Wittgensteinian view 
that concepts are acquired through the learning of general terms. But, says 
Haldane, this explanation generates a vicious regress: "The 
Wittgensteinian proposal that concepts are inculcated through member-
ship of a linguistic community ... is not itself ultimately explanatory 
because for any natural language user it requires us to postulate a prior 
one. This regress will be halted if there is an actualising source whose own 
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conceptual power is intrinsic; and, that of course is precisely what God is 
traditionally taken to be" (21). 
The Prime Thinker argument is provocative, but I found Haldane's pre-
sentation of it rather wanting. There are at least three respects in which the 
argument seems seriously under-developed. First, Haldane says nothing 
about the fact that individuals and communities can develop novel con-
cepts and words. On the face of it, this would seem to be explicit proof that 
one can acquire a new concept/word without being taught it. But perhaps 
this point misconstrues the heart of Haldane's dissatisfaction with natural-
ism. Perhaps his objection isn't that naturalism can't account for the unas-
sisted acquisition of new concepts, but that it can't account for the unassist-
ed acquisition of conceptual abilities tout court (22). But more needs to be 
said here, for its plausible to suppose that these two abilities are closely 
related. Second, Haldane says nothing about how God is meant to have 
actualized our conceptual powers. Presumably Haldane's account is meant 
to be inconsistent with evolutionary accounts of the genesis of language, 
but he doesn't directly engage with, or even mention, such accounts. Third, 
the argument assumes that God's conceptual powers are unproblematical-
ly intrinsic: unlike our powers, God's conceptual abilities can be actualized 
without the aid of another concept-using being. But what is the difference 
between God's conceptual powers and ours? Haldane leaves it completely 
mysterious why our conceptual powers must be actualised by another 
mind if God's conceptual powers needn't. There seems to be a decidedly 
large frog grinning up from the bottom of this beer mug. 
Houston's paper is a detailed critique of Alston's paper "Referring to 
God".J In that paper, Alston develops a Kripkean account of reference to 
God, on which "God" enters a language as a name or label for the object of 
religious experience rather than by way of descriptive content. Once intro-
duced into the language, other speakers use "God" intending to refer to 
whatever it was that those who introduced the word into the language 
intended to name. Alston acknowledges that theists normally take certain 
characteristics to be necessary for being God, but he denies that such char-
acteristics playa role in determining the referent of "God." 
Houston argues that Alston's attempt to downplay the importance of 
descriptive content in securing reference to God is unsuccessful. His objec-
tion centers on the problem of co-reference. Members of a religious com-
munity must have reason to think that the object of their perception is the 
very same object that prompted the introduction of "God" into their lexi-
con. Houston argues that this can happen only if the members of a theistic 
community can recognize God as God. 
How is this to happen? Alston skates over, slides past, that issue 
when he should not have done. He should not have done because 
recognition of God as God will seem to many of his readers most 
likely to be secured by the employment of uniquely specifying 
descriptions. If this is indeed how the essential recognition of God as 
God is supposed to happen, then descriptions specifying God will 
have to be developed, and must playa vital and recurring role in the 
life of Alston's theistic community. (47) 
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I think that Houston has identified an important problem for Alston's 
account of reference, but I don't think we need to look to uniquely identify-
ing description in order to solve it. Clearly various perceivings need to have 
perceptual (representational) content in common in order for it to be reason-
able to judge them as co-referential. But such representational content need 
not rise to the level of uniquely specifying descriptions. Suppose that you 
and I are hiking in the woods. I hear a strange birdcall, very low and stacca-
to. But you're a few minutes behind me, and don't hear it. Later, I do a poor 
imitation of the birdcall, and ask you if you've ever heard it before. You say 
that it sounds very much like a bird you heard earlier in the day. We might 
suspect that we heard the same kind of bird (and perhaps the same actual 
bird). And this suspicion seems perfectly reasonable. Yet neither of us have 
provided anything approaching a uniquely specifying description of the 
referent of our experience. We've articulated a certain amount of the repre-
sentational content of our respective experiences, and in our present context 
the amount of convergence of this perceptual content suffices to make an 
identification of our perceptual objects reasonable. 
How much (agreement in) representational content must perceptions 
have in order for us to be justified in thinking that they are co-referential? 
A number of factors might be relevant here. For instance, if we think that 
there are very few bird species about with similar songs, then we will be 
inclined to demand rather little agreement in representational content 
before judging that we heard the same bird. On the other hand, if we think 
that the woods in which we're hiking are rich with similar sounding birds, 
then we might be inclined to demand a substantial amount of representa-
tional detail from our experiences before identifying their objects. 
How does this bear on the theological issue? Well, it seems reasonable to 
hold that religious experiences must have some representational content in 
common before one will take them to be experiences of the same object, i.e., 
before one will be prepared to use the same proper name to describe their 
objects. But how much content must such experiences share? I'm not sure that 
there is any straightforward answer to this question. It seems to me that a 
community's beliefs about the possible causes of religious experiences are rele-
vant here. If one thinks that there are many supernatural entities (not to men-
tion naturalistic processes), each of which is capable of generating "religious 
experiences," then one might demand a high degree of specificity in content 
before judging that the object of one's experience is the God of Abraham, Isaac 
and Jacob. If, on the other hand, one holds that religious experiences are only 
brought about by God, then one might be rather more willing to identify the 
referents of various religious experiences without detailed descriptive content. 
(Of course, one still needs sufficient content to class them as religious experi-
ences). Although this line of thought fails to endorse the letter of Houston's 
position in that it rejects the needs for uniquely identifying content (is percep-
tual content ever uniquely identifying?), it does support the spirit of his posi-
tion, which is to argue that Alston underplays the role of descriptive content 
with respect to issues of religious reference. 
Alston argues that his direct reference approach to religious language has 
implications for inter-religious dialogue. In particular, he claims that it is 
conducive to inclusivist approaches in a way that descriptive accounts aren't. 
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If one's referent in religious worship and discourse is determined by 
what one takes God to be like, then we, the Hindus, and the ancient 
Greeks and Romans cannot be credited with worshipping the same 
being. But if reference is determined rather by the real contacts from 
which a referential practice stems, then there may indeed be a com-
mon referent, in case these traditions, including their referential tradi-
tions, all stemmed from experiential contacts with the one God. 
(Alston, 1989: 115) 
Houston is not convinced. He argues that in order for Christians, Jews and 
Moslems to belong to the one theistic tradition, 
... there has to be recognition of God as God. And to secure recogni-
tion requires the recognizer be in possession of, i.e. to know of, indi-
viduating characteristics of God and to have descriptions at his dis-
posal which provide specifying descriptiveness. So not only do defi-
nite descriptions return to the picture in an important role, but also, 
and as a result, seekers of inter-religious ecumenism will require to 
address questions about the appropriateness of particular definite 
descriptions to the God whom we in our community already (think 
we) know, and to the one encountered/perceived by some other per-
son. Appealing to the primacy of direct reference will not exclude 
theological debate about what to say of God, from inter-religious rap-
prochement, or inter-denominational, inter-faction, coming together 
within a religion. (60) 
I'm not sure how fair this is. Alston's position allows that the adherents of 
different faiths can disagree about God's properties, and even about which 
properties are necessary for being God. His central point is only that such dis-
agreement does not impact on the question of whether the adherents of dif-
ferent faiths are talking about one and the same entity. But what about 
Houston's central point: that inter-religious dialogue can't escape the need for 
definite descriptions? One key issue here, not brought out by Houston's dis-
cussion, may be the extent to which the faiths in question are historically con-
nected. Alston's picture of reference can downplay the importance of descrip-
tive content when the religions in question are historically connected. Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism are, of course, historically connected: Muhammad 
and Jesus borrowed "God" from Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. But what about 
religions that aren't historically connected, where there are doubts for think-
ing that the various uses of "God" (and its cognates in other languages) are 
derived from a single baptismal ceremony? What should Alston say here? I 
think he would (or should) be willing to find a role for descriptive content in 
deciding whether or not these uses of "God" are co-referential. 
NOTES 
1. Alston, 1989 "Referring to God," in Divine Nature and Human Language 
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